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LAWYERS AND CONSCIENCE
by Thomas H. Morawetz*
I. THE NEED FOR MORAL REFLECTION AND JUSTIFICATION
It would be perverse to say that lawyers, unlike the rest of human-
ity, should not take responsibility for their actions or be held responsi-
ble for their choices. Some philosophers would maintain that moral cat-
egories, and the practice of using standards to judge conduct, are
spontaneous aspects of language and thought." To abstain from holding
certain persons morally responsible is to exclude them from the general
run of humanity.2 From such a perspective, to say that lawyers either
should or should not be held responsible for their conduct is to say
something peculiar, for the commitment to regarding them as responsi-
ble is not a matter of choice.'
The suggestion that lawyers are not to be held responsible for their
actions is not, therefore, simply an argument for their exemption from
moral judgment. It is rather an argument that an overriding or super-
vening moral judgment must be taken into account when lawyers are
judged, a judgment about the character of the institutions and proce-
dures that define the lawyer's role.' For example, the defense of the
adversary model provided by Dean Monroe Freedman and Charles
* Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. Historically important discussions of the spontaneity of moral judgment are to be found in
D. HUmm, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (1751), and I. KANT. FOUNDA-
TIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785). For a modem treatment of the subject, see P.
NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS, ch. 1 (1954).
2. Of course, we exempt young children, persons who are retarded or brain-damaged, or per-
sons from very primitive and alien cultures from at least some moral judgments. Lawyers would
probably not wish to claim an analogous disability.
3. The place of the concepts of freedom, resentment, and moral responsibility in the general
attitudes of persons to other persons is explored perceptively in Strawson, Freedom and Resent-
ment, 48 PROC. OF THE BRT. ACAo. 186 (1962).
4. Such an approach to the issue is taken, for example, in Freedman, Professional Responsi-
bility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions. 64 MICH. L RE,. 1469
(1966), and Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1976).
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Fried5 is anything but amoral. Freedman and Fried argue that the ad-
versary process is an especially effective vehicle for fair, just, and equi-
table disposition of legal disputes. The process works optimally, how-
ever, only if the lawyer uses the resources of the legal process single-
mindedly to secure the interests of clients.' According to proponents of
the adversary model, the process and the law in general rectify imbal-
ances in power and skill, and transpose any dispute to an even playing
field.7
This way of thinking has much to do with the way we think of
games. In games, the morality of acting in accord with the rules and of
being an adversary is taken for granted. Similarly, the lawyer may no
more second-guess the fairness and justice of the rules of combat (by
tempering zealous representation in light of the possible consequences
for other players or for society in general) than she may question, while
in the middle of playing chess or baseball, whether the rules are fair
and just and attempt to alter strategy in the interest of fairness to the
opposition or to third parties. The pitcher who pitches with an eye to-
ward serving interests other than his team's interest in winning is not
quite playing baseball.' A moral judgment about fairness is more ap-
propriately made when the rules of combat are formulated, not when
the rules are being applied in mid-game.9
There are many problems with this comparison between lawyering
and games. The rules of combat in the adversary system remain un-
clear and controversial. What one lawyer regards as fair and exemplary
in questioning adverse witnesses or in shielding a client from the conse-
quences of ongoing criminal activity, another may see as unfair and
harmful to the interests of third parties. By contrast, the rules of base-
ball or chess are more or less closed. Moral dilemmas do not infect
every single choice of strategy, rendering each choice potentially con-
troversial. In games, the rules are fixed, and the players, in making
their discrete moves, are expected to put to one side the overall moral-
5. See supra note 4.
6. Freedman, supra note 4, at 1473-74.
7. Fried, supra note 4, at 1082-86.
8. I discuss the implications of the comparison between the rules of law and the rules of games
in Morawetz, The Rules of Law and the Point of Law, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1973); see also
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL REV. 3 (1955).
9. Such a theory resembles the "rule-utilitarian" model of moral reasoning, whereby systems
of rules (for example, the rules of a game or the rules of a practice), rather than individual acts,
are evaluated so as to determine whether they optimize achievement of the goal (e.g., utility). See
D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965); D. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND CO-
OPERATION (1980).
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ity of the game itself.1"
In legal contests, the lawyer who assumes that the adversary sys-
tem is fair exposes herself to the accusation that she is willfully naive
about the context in which such contests proceed. Her failing is not
that she has neglected altogether to provide a moral justification; rather
it is that her justification is not grounded in reality. The reality, in the
view of many observers, 1 is that neither the fairness of the adversary
system nor the equal worth of each client can be taken for granted. The
objectives of some clients will further the public interest and the objec-
tives of others will frustrate it. Lawyers, having limited resources of
time and energy, will often have the incentive to serve the wealthiest
and most powerful clients, whatever the morality of the clients' objec-
tives. A client's resources may affect both the lawyer's initial decision
to choose the client and her choice of strategies in legal representation.
Thus, the potential for unfairness and inequality is built into the
adversary system at several levels. Such inequity manifests itself in our
uncertainty about what strategies are permissible, in our recognition
that the interests of clients are not equally conducive to the general
welfare, and in our awareness that the resources of the system are im-
perfect and limited.12
II. THE ROLE OF CODES AND COURSES
If lawyers cannot evade moral judgment and cannot pass the buck
to the system itself, two questions are inescapable. The first question is
how one can distinguish an ethical lawyer from an unethical one; the
second is how to make lawyers more ethical. Daniel Kleinberger 3 con-
cludes that neither codes of ethics nor courses on professional responsi-
bility do much to make lawyers ethically responsible. Such a conclusion
is based on several assumptions, some sound and others unsound.
Several ways of distinguishing ethical lawyers from unethical law-
yers are obviously flawed. Reputation is an uncertain guide. Perhaps
the ethical lawyer will be more widely respected. Nonetheless, the
judgment of lay persons may rest on a false conception of the lawyering
10. See supra notes 8 & 9.
11. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1976); M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980).
12. See Fried, supra note 4.
13. Kleinberger, Wanted An Ethos of Personal Responsibilit)-Why Codes of Ethics and
Schools of Law Don't Make for Ethical Lawyers, 21 CONN. L REv. 365 (1989).
1989]
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process or of the reasons lawyers act as they do,1 4 and the judgment of
other professionals may be distorted by the need to protect the reputa-
tion of the profession from all criticism, justified or not.
If reputation is at best an unreliable criterion, one must look in-
stead to a lawyer's actions and attitudes. While actions may speak
louder than words, they are corrupted by ambiguity just as words are.
Two lawyers whose reputations are tarnished by their zealous represen-
tation of unpopular clients may have very different reasons for acting.
The first may act out of a deep faith in the adversary system, the sec-
ond out of concern only for personal gain. Thus, the crucial factor dis-
tinguishing the ethical lawyer from the amoral lawyer must lie not in
actions pure and simple but in the attitude that underlies those actions.
In what way can codes of ethics or legal training affect a lawyer's
attitudes? Kleinberger largely dismisses the question, which nonethe-
less deserves careful attention.15 One preliminary consideration is that
it is dangerous to generalize about lawyers' moral dispositions. Some
lawyers will be more conscientious than others, more attentive to admo-
nitions of conscience. Some lawyers will be more malleable than others,
more easily moved by good arguments or by bad ones. Of course, codes
and courses cannot transform the most callous and self-interested oper-
ators into lawyers of conscience. At best, codes and training can acti-
vate preexisting inclinations. Moreover, many aspects of legal educa-
tion do foster skepticism about moral values, simple-minded relativism,
and a chameleon-like disposition to identify with and defend all posi-
tions.1" The image of the lawyer as "gun-for-hire" is as old as the pro-
fession itself.
Nonetheless, it.is hard to see why one should take a dismissive
position toward codes of ethics. The effect of codes is not necessarily
exhausted by the process of disciplinary enforcement and the rules are
not necessarily moral minima.17 At least for some lawyers, codes will
14. For a general discussion of the complexities involved in assessing role morality in general,
and the morality of legal professionals in particular, see D. LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER 1-24
(1984) and D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988).
15. See Kleinberger, supra note 13, at 367.
16. See Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 71
(1970); Luban, Against Autarky, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 176 (1984); Wasserstrom, Legal Education
and the Good Lawyer, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1984).
17. The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility makes this point clear by distinguishing
disciplinary rules from ethical considerations. The distinction is, as one might expect, not always
easy to maintain. Some disciplinary rules do not seem to represent what is minimally permissible,
and some ethical considerations do not seem to express ethical aspirations or ideals. See Frankel,
Book Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 874 (1976) (reviewing Code of Professional Responsibility
(Vol. 21:383
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affect attitudes, and therefore behavior, by defining a standard of con-
scientiousness and exhorting lawyers to follow it. Codes will elucidate
the shared expectations of the bar and the common center of gravity of
the practice.
For example, a confidentiality provision that advises attorneys to
intervene and to breach confidentiality when their clients' actions affect
third parties in seriously harmful ways will shape conduct differently
than would a stricter prohibition on disclosure.1 8 Of course, such a pro-
vision may be difficult to enforce. Of course, some lawyers will scorn it
and evade it cheerfully. And of course, such provisions may be re-
garded cynically as mere examples of the bar paying lip service to pub-
lic opinion. Nevertheless, such a change may go a long way in shaping
the attitudes and practices of some lawyers. To think otherwise is to see
lawyers as beyond change and beyond redemption, to see the members
of the profession as self-selected for moral unresponsiveness. Under
such an assumption, there is no reason to urge reform or to admonish
lawyers to heed morality since lawyers are assumed to be incapable of
doing so. 9
Similarly, courses in professional responsibility can awaken dor-
mant unease rather than indoctrinate students in the techniques of
moral evasion. Law teachers, like law students, come in many shapes
and flavors. Some will connive with their most cynical students to sub-
vert whatever moral reservations other students may have and to coun-
sel the efficient evasion of even minimal constraints. Others will try in
vain to lead students to frame moral limitations for themselves. Still
others, however, will succeed in influencing students to attend to per-
sonal and cultural convictions that coexist with training in legal tech-
nique, and to have misgivings about some implications of the adversary
model itself. One cannot assume that teachers who are committed to an
amoral model and who teach evasion are the norm, nor can one assume
that students normally lack misgivings or conscience.20 To assume ei-
(1975)).
18. See Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences, 52 U. CoLo. L REv. 349
(1981); Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in D. LuBAN. THE
GoOD LAWYER, at 191; Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MicH L. REV. 1485 (1966).
19. It is important for commentators to be clear about their psychological assumptions about
human nature and about lawyers. Do they assume law students are malleable and are able to
respond to moral arguments, to arguments appealing to altruism and justice, or do they assume
the opposite? Similarly, what assumptions of these kinds do they make about practicing attorneys
and about bodies that draft and enforce legal rules?
20. Kleinberger's description sometimes comes close to embodying these assumptions. See
1989]
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ther is to transpose cynicism to a different plane. To view the world of
law teachers and students as composed of moral cynics is itself a form
of cynicism.
Generalizing about codes and curricula is also a perilous enter-
prise. Some code provisions, for example those concerning conflict of
interests or use of clients' funds, are necessarily expressed as prohibi-
tions, as rules distinguishing what is acceptable from what is not. Other
issues addressed in the code are natural vehicles for moral idealism.
Provisions that describe the limits of confidentiality and those that
touch on concern for third parties and for the public interest can have
such moral significance."1 They may or may not be conceived as de-
lineations of what is minimally acceptable; certainly there is no need to
frame them in such a way. 2
Just as general codes and rules can be made to accommodate ide-
alism, so too can legal education make room for moral responsiveness.
Every substantive course in the curriculum can be made a vehicle for
exploring the effects of legal doctrine and lawyers' actions upon the
well-being of individuals and the community.23 To be sure, the tech-
niques of legal representation and argumentation are morally neutral.
These techniques may, however, be supplemented by an independent
examination of the consequences of actions. The mastery of a technique
never preempts the possibility of taking consequences seriously.
Kleinberger draws our attention to campaign managers as analogues of
lawyers.24 The tools of the campaign manager may be used by amoral
managers for bad candidates, but there is nothing inherent in campaign
techniques that stands in the way of choosing to use the techniques
only for good candidates.
This last point needs amplification. Morality is implicated in legal
strategies and techniques in two ways. The first involves the morality of
clients' ends. I have been emphasizing that the lawyer, like the cam-
paign manager, may limit her services to those whose interests she can
Kleinberger, supra note 13, at 367.
21. See, e.g., Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1031
(1975).
22. One issue that complicates the drafting and application of such rules concerns whether
rules should give lawyers wide discretion to take moral responsibility and to weigh the effects of
their actions, or alternatively whether such rules should make protection of the public interest
mandatory.
23. It is commonly suggested by curriculum reform committees that various courses should be
given an explicit legal ethics component. Many law teachers already introduce such issues
implicitly.
24. See Kleinberger, supra note 13, at 372.
[Vol. 21:383
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approve. The second, however, involves the morality of the techniques
themselves. Techniques such as discrediting witnesses whom one knows
to be speaking the truth and using testimony that one suspects is per-
jured are not morally neutral.2 5 Moreover, these techniques remain
morally objectionable even when used to serve clients whose interests
are meritorious.
Drafters of codes of professional responsibility must balance the
objective of providing clear guidance on such moral matters and the
need to show respect for the moral discretion and independence of indi-
vidual lawyers. If the drafters conclude that the use of objectionable
techniques is sometimes justified by the particular ends at issue, they
may make the techniques discretionary rather than forbid them alto-
gether. Such discretion presumes not only that the techniques may be
used in exceptional circumstances, but also that lawyers may be trusted
to decide for themselves which instances are exceptional, trusted, that
is, not to abuse this discretion.2"
Both codes and courses are appropriate contexts for seeking to
wake lawyers' awareness of moral considerations and to show that the
responsibility for choosing strategies and ends must rest with the indi-
vidual rather than the system. At the same time, it would be naive to
underestimate the difficulties that stand in the way of changing law-
yers' incentives. These difficulties are psychological rather than concep-
tual. Where legal services are highly rewarded, many of the most
skilled lawyers will tend to serve the highest bidder. Viewed from this
standpoint, conscience-raising through codes or courses is a weak
weapon. This weakness is rooted in the economic and political structure
of society, in the distribution of resources and the incentive structure
that it creates.
Any analysis of the situation must be poised between hope and
realism. To be sure, some lawyers will be guided by moral conscience.
Training will effectively sensitize some (perhaps many) lawyers to the
moral aspects of their actions. Existing (or new) organizations of law-
yers or judges or laypersons may change the rules and incline the play-
ing field toward morally justifiable consequences. Nonetheless, intract-
able social, economic, and psychological obstacles may well stand in the
25. See Fried, supra note 4, at 1064-65; Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission"
Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL EmTics 125 (1987).
26. It may be idealistic to believe that lawyers can moderate the use of such strategies by
taking into account the pursuit of justice and the rights of third parties.
1989]
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way of significant change in both practice and reputation."1
III. MORAL RELATIVISM
Lawyers who are admonished to heed morality and to be conscien-
tious will often respond with puzzlement. When land developers con-
front environmentalists, when landlords trying to protect investments
confront aggrieved tenants, moral priorities are hardly self-evident.
Lawyers may make a general point about the morality of representa-
tion, namely that in such cases there is no firm ground on which to
justify one choice of values over another.
This argument needs clarification. Certainly the examples suggest
that in many confrontations the positions of both sides have merit. At
the same time, every conscientious lawyer will recognize that cases dif-
fer in weight and importance. For example, the set of confrontations
between developers and environmentalists (or others) 28 may run the
gamut from compelling cases for development to equally compelling
cases for protection and preservation. Even if lawyers disagree in their
final judgment about a case, they will often agree about what factors
are relevant, about the relative weight to be assigned such factors, and
about what cases are stronger (or weaker) than others. In a sense, these
standards of relevance form the common language within which coher-
ent disagreement is possible.29 Such standards are both descriptive and
normative. Put simply, the standards tell us, for example, what counts
as economic loss, but also tell us that economic loss is, other things
being equal, to be minimized.
In other words, the argument for moral uncertainty or relativism is
necessarily incomplete. To say that every case involving development or
foreclosure has something to be said in its favor is not to say that every
case is equally meritorious. To say that lawyers will often disagree
about the merits of particular cases is not to say that lawyers lack
shared standards for judging some cases to be weaker than others.30
27. It can be argued that a significant societal change would affect not only the willingness of
lawyers to consider morality, but also more basic matters, such as society's need for lawyers and
the distribution of demand for lawyers' services.
28. One can imagine different kinds of opponents: environmentalists, historical preservation-
ists, the indigenous residents and users of the land in question, the population of the surrounding
area, etc.
29. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (1969), and T. MORAWETZ, WITTGEN-
STEIN AND KNOWLEDGE 119-38 (1978) (discussion of the epistemological aspects of agreement
and disagreement).
30. Cf. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REV. I (1988):
[Vol. 21:383
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Nor is it to say that a lawyer who engages in predatory and harmful
practices should be exempt from criticism for doing so.
Lawyers, in response, will say that such criticism is misguided be-
cause, apart from the merits of a particular position, each party has a
right to be heard and to have a sound case presented on its behalf. The
value of being able to present one's case should be distinguished from
the value of the position itself. To agree, however, that a distinct value
exists is not to say that the value is an overriding one. Because a law-
yer's time and energies are limited, it is difficult to think of a sound
moral argument against using such resources selectively for the most
compelling interests.3 1
Moral relativism sometimes takes an "absolutist" form. Those who
concede that there are shared standards for unconscionable interests
may yet wish to refrain from judging actions and effects in moral terms
unless it is possible to provide a decisive or absolute justification. "Who
am I to judge?" expresses this response.
It is one thing to bear in mind, when representing a client, that
one may not know all the facts or to acknowledge that opinions about a
client's conduct and the effects of such conduct will differ. To engage in
such thinking is to judge wisely. Yet, it is something entirely different
to assume that no standards exist for judging conduct or that the stan-
dards we have-the only standards we can have-lack legitimacy.32
The admonition that one should generally refrain from making moral
judgments impeaches much more than our moral judgments about law-
yers' choices. It embodies a fallacious distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate judging that impeaches basic ways of thinking and ori-
enting oneself in the social world. Judging is an eradicable dimension
of thinking. Our moral judgments do not hang in a linguistic vacuum;
they are tied conceptually to notions of harm and destruction, well-
being and health. Our criminal statutes, our medical practices, and our
governmental policies all presuppose general agreement about which
kinds of circumstances are desirable and which kinds are to be avoided.
It's easy to say lawyering is not a club for superhumans, and that especially in this cen-
tury lawyers have been joined, and in many areas of political life displaced, by rival
interpreters and articulators and mediators of social purposes. What's absurd is to argue
that because of this lawyers are uniquely disqualified as citizens or moral and political
actors-the one group of individuals in the world who should conscientiously attempt to
reduce themselves to ciphers, pure media of transmission.
Id. at 75.
31. See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L REv 589 (1985).
32. See id.
19891
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The justification of all such judgments is internal to a system of
thought and not "absolute."33 Everything hangs or falls together.
IV. SKEPTICISM AND FAIR DESCRIPTION
One thread running through my discussion has been a warning
against "all or nothing" thinking, a kind of thinking that leads to the
overly simplified and skeptical conclusions that codes express minimal
expectations (and therefore cannot express moral ideals) and that law
schools cannot affect moral conscience. Professor Kleinberger's essay
contains several obstacles to clear discussion of these issues.
Paradoxically Kleinberger uses Thomas Hobbes' moral and politi-
cal philosophy to illustrate the need for moral reflection.34 Of all philos-
ophers, Hobbes is the least congenial to these purposes. Hobbes' philos-
ophy is grounded on the psychological assumption that persons can and
will act only for their personal self-interest."5 Hobbes theorized that
people create and maintain political institutions only because, and only
as long as, doing so benefits them more than existing in a state of
nature.
This view of "the hearts and minds of the system's
handmaidens"36 and of human nature generally places persons beyond
the reach of moral arguments. Appeals to altruism or conscience are,
for Hobbes, inherently stillborn unless they are also grounded in ap-
peals to self-interest.37 Those who say, perhaps cynically, that one can-
not expect lawyers to be other than "guns-for-hire" seem to share Hob-
bes' deterministic conception of human nature. It is odd that
Kleinberger uses Hobbes for quite the opposite argument when less
dogmatic and simplistic views of human motivation are available and
persuasive.3 8
It is also peculiar that Kleinberger uses the moral circumstances of
33. See P. STRAWSON. SKEPTICISM AND NATURALISM: SOME VARIETIES 41 (1985).
34. See Kleinberger, supra note 13, at 375.
35. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. II and XIII (1st ed. 1651); see also C. MACPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962); Minogue, Hobbes
and the Just Man, in HOBBES AND ROUSSEAU: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 66 (1972).
36. See Kleinberger, supra note 13, at 375.
37. See supra note 35. The ethical theory called "hedonistic egoism" is generally attributed to
Hobbes.
38. Most ethical philosophers, both historical and modern, have advanced theories that are
less deterministic and hedonistic than Hobbes. Aristotle and Kant are two of the most influential
figures in the history of ethical thought, and both have accommodated altruism and moral action
for its own sake.
[Vol. 21:383
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the campaign adviser to illuminate the role of lawyers. 9 There are spe-
cial justifications for the moral neutrality of campaign advisers which
are not similarly applicable to lawyers. Choosing between candidates
for office is a pure form of democratic participation. If democratic the-
ory is to have a chance of working, candidates must possess the re-
sources necessary to run for office. Thus, the argument that campaign
directors should forestall prejudging candidates on moral grounds is
particularly strong, while the act of withholding resources from candi-
dates based upon moral preconceptions can be compared to a kind of
censorship. If the adversary process, and other aspects of the legal pro-
cess, were as formally democratic as the process of voting, a strong
argument could be made for lawyers' neutrality. As matters stand,
however, the processes and values are too dissimilar."°
A deeper paradox is implicit in lawyers' discretion to choose
among clients and interests. On the one hand, such discretion frees law-
yers to attend to the moral implications of their choices. On the other
hand, lawyers may channel their activity in whatever ways will most
gratify self-interest. In other words, two ways of choosing clients can be
morally criticized. First, a lawyer may act purely out of self-interest.
Second, a lawyer may offer zealous representation to each client in
turn, acting disinterestedly as "gun-for-hire."'41 Both types of action are
to be contrasted with acting out of a morally determined choice, with a
sense that one is selecting among competing interests and demands af-
ter considering their respective merits.
The role of law schools in priming students to make such choices is
also described inadequately in Kleinberger's essay. He contrasts two
possible tasks for the law teacher. The first involves preaching about
moral values, which as Kleinberger correctly observes is likely to be
ineffective or, worse, counterproductive. The second task consists of
teaching students "to operate rationally in a world of concepts and
symbols." 42 Kleinberger argues that instruction "can do little . . . to
develop moral commitment" because "[c]haracter is a matter not of
analysis but of faith. ' 43 Perhaps this is so. Nonetheless, the sources of
39. See Kleinberger, supra note 13, at 372.
40. To be sure, there are many ways to corrupt the process of voting just as there are many
ways to corrupt the process of litigation. In both situations, the actor, as campaign manager or
lawyer, must look to ends as well as means.
41. Such a distinction may collapse when the rationale for acting as "gun-for-hire" is used to
justify acting out of self-interest.
42. See Kleinberger, supra note 13, at 379.
43. Id.
1989]
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character and the issue of what it takes to change character are mat-
ters of deep controversy and cannot be settled casually. Certainly char-
acter and faith are distinct notions, linked in some ways and not others.
It is certainly widely believed that one can be a person of character
without being a person of faith in a traditional sense.
Rational and analytic thinking is not necessarily morally neutral,
as Kleinberger assumes." For example, analytic thinking can uncover
the flaws in arguments used by lawyers to avoid responsibility for their
actions, arguments such as the claim that the adversary system works
itself pure. In this way analytic thinking can be used to demonstrate
the need for and inevitability of personal responsibility. That is not to
say that rational and analytic thinking can shape character or can
make persons moral. Where the commitment to neutrality is intellec-
tual, however, rational argumentation can be used to dispell it.
CONCLUSION
Any serious discussion of lawyers' ethics will rest on several
premises.
(1) Lawyers, unlike doctors, are inevitably partisans in human
conflicts. Doctors represent the uncontroversial ideal of health. Lawyers
represent the ideals of order and justice in dispute resolution, but they
also represent particular claimants with particular and often divisive
interests. 45 The theme of legal representation is that of victory and de-
feat, rather than that of harmony and cooperation." One commentator
has observed that "[w]e use lawyers both to express our longing for a
common good, and to express our distaste for collective discipline. ' 41
(2) Lawyers therefore present a "public and unavoidable embodi-
ment of the tension we all experience between the desire for an em-
bracing and common community and the urge toward individual inde-
pendence and self-assertion; between the need for a stable, coherent,
sincerely presented self and the fragmented and disassociated roles we
are forced to play in the theater of modern life."' 48 As a result, "the
special hatred which popular culture holds for the lawyer can be an
44. Id. at 378-79.
45. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1, 12
(1975).
46. Harmonious dispute resolution, however, has drawn increasing attention from lawyers and
law schools in recent years.
47. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF L. Ra3v.
379, 386 (1987).
48. Id. at 389.
[Vol. 21:383
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illuminating resource for understanding cultural contradictions of the
deepest and most profound kind."4 9 The unpopularity of lawyers is en-
demic to the role they play, and the role is, in turn, endemic to organ-
ized society.
(3) At the same time, specific cultural, social, and economic condi-
tions can aggravate or mitigate social disparities and shape the kinds of
conflicts that will arise. The degree to which lawyers are a lightning
rod for discontent will depend on the scope of such disparities and on
the responsiveness of the legal system to problems that arise.
(4) Lawyers are human beings, and therefore some will be venal
and others will be altruistic. All, however, will have complex motives
and aims. In addition, in every society some ways of practicing law are
better rewarded than others. When the practical rewards of represent-
ing private corporate interests far outweigh the rewards of representing
the rights of the powerless, these social facts represent serious obstacles
to the conscientious practice of law.
(5) Finally, there is nothing inherent in the lawyer's role that
should exempt her from moral criticism. Personal responsibility is the
common denominator of social conduct for all persons who are not spe-
cifically disabled.50 The lawyer's choices cannot be reduced to simple
rules nor is her role ever reducible to one of ethical neutrality. All of us
are responsible for the consequences of our conduct. If we play a role in
a larger system, we must be able to justify both the role and the
system.
One may draw several conclusions from all this. The unpopularity
of lawyers is only partly within their control.Some of the unpopularity
may be attributed to the kind of role lawyers play and not to the way
they play it. Moreover, social and economic conditions shape lawyers'
incentives and opportunities. In some societies, the opportunity to act
on altruistic motives will be available and visible, while in other socie-
ties this opportunity will be more elusive. These conditions are within
some degree of social control, but they are certainly not within the con-
trol of individual attorneys.
At the same time, there is a narrower dimension within which a
lawyer has choices. Notwithstanding the difficulties of enforcement and
the necessary vagueness of its provisions, a code of professional ethics
can do more than formulate rules for minimally acceptable conduct. A
49. Id.
50. See supra note 2.
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code can also express aspirations. Similarly, legal training can do much
more than merely arm lawyers with technical skills. Legal education
can acquaint law students with moral reasoning, can show them that
lawyers are not exempt from moral judgment, and can make them
thoughtful about the consequences of their actions. If in fact legal
training gives rise to amorality and moral cynicism, the problem is only
partially remediable. Understanding and accepting the inevitable rea-
sons why lawyers will be "hated"'" is the first step in acting to counter
and discredit that hatred.
51. See supra note 47.
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